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Abstract—Anonymized social network graphs published for
academic or advertisement purposes are subject to de-
anonymization attacks by leveraging side information in the form
of a second, public social network graph correlated with the
anonymized graph. This is because the two are from the same
underlying graph of true social relationships. In this paper, the
maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of user identities for the
anonymized graph are characterized and sufficient conditions
for successful de-anonymization for underlying graphs with
community structure are provided. The results generalize prior
work that assumed underlying graphs of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi type,
and prove the optimality of the attack strategy adopted in the
literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy of users in social networking sites is an important
concern, especially with the rising popularity of social net-
works. Social network data is often intentionally (and some-
times accidentally) revealed for academic and advertisement
purposes. Before such revelations, names and other identifying
information about users are usually omitted (or randomized)
in an effort to preserve the anonymity of the users. However,
removing user names from published data may not in itself
be sufficient to preserve privacy. This is because an attacker
might be able to use publicly available side information
correlated with the anonymized data to recover user identities.
For instance, anonymized Netflix data of user viewing pref-
erences was de-anonymized using a publicly available IMDB
database [1].
In this work, we focus on the problem of privacy in social
networks when the data published by the networking site is an
anonymized graph of user connectivity. That is, each vertex in
the graph is a user, and users that are connected (for instance,
friends) share an undirected edge. The graph is anonymized
by removing or randomizing the labels corresponding to each
vertex. However, as in the Netflix/IMDB example above, an
attacker might be able to recover some or all of the user
identities using data from a second social network whose
graph of user connectivity is publicly available. For example,
Narayanan and Shmatikov demonstrated an attack in which
anonymized Twitter users were identified using Flickr data [2].
The success of social network de-anonymization is premised
on the observation that data from two social networks can be
reasonably expected to be correlated assuming that the two
graphs, g1 and g2, are independently sampled (with probability
s) from the same underlying graph, g, which represents
the true relationships between all users. In recent work [3],
Pedarsani and Grossglauser have theoretically analyzed the
social network de-anonymization by assuming that the under-
lying graph, g, is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with edge probability
p. In particular, [3] establishes sufficient conditions on the
edge probability, p, and sampling probability, s, that guarantee
perfect de-anonymization, that is, each user in the anonymized
network is correctly identified.
There are several important directions in which the prior
work can be extended. First, in obtaining their results,
Pedarsani and Grossglauser [3] and succeeding work [4], [5]
assume that the attacker matches nodes in the anonymized
graph to those in the public graph so as to minimize a certain
cost function, which is the number of mismatched edges.
However, the authors do not provide a rationale for this choice
of cost function, or prove the optimality of the attacker’s
strategy. Second, it has been empirically shown that graphs
of social interaction are not, in fact, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and instead
have community structure [6]. A natural question, therefore,
is what are the attacker’s capabilities when the statistics of the
underlying graph reflect community structure? The goal of our
work is to address these questions.
Specifically, in this paper, we make the following contribu-
tions. First, we derive the maximum a posteriori probability
(MAP) matching of nodes in the anonymized graph to the
public graph assuming an underlying graph g with community
structure. For the special case of a graph with a single com-
munity, which is simply an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph, we establish
the equivalence between the MAP matching and the matching
that minimizes Pedarsani and Grossglauser’s cost function,
establishing the optimality of the attacker’s strategy in that and
several succeeding works. Second, we determine conditions
on the parameters of the underlying graph and the sampling
probability that guarantee perfect de-anonymization for the
general case of graphs with community structure.
We note that when g has community structure, the de-
anonymization problem has some relation to the well known
community detection problem [7]. Hence the problem can
be viewed as community detection with side information,
although we note that recovering the community labels in
g2 is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for de-
anonymization. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on an
attack setting in which the attacker’s goal is to determine user
identities only, assuming that the community labels in g1 and
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g2 are known.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let g = (V,Eg) be an undirected graph of true relationships
between n users. The number of users is |V | = n, and the edge
set is Eg ⊆ V ×V . We assume nodes of g are partitioned into
disjoint subsets of k ≥ 1 communities, C1, C2, . . . , Ck. The
number of nodes in community Ci is |Ci| = ni. An example
of g for the two community case is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. System model with the underlying graph g with 2 communities, the
public graph g1 and the anonymized graph g2.
Edges in Eg are drawn independently at random as follows:
nodes u ∈ Ci and v ∈ Cj are connected with probability pij .
In literature, this model is referred to as the stochastic block
model [6], and is simply the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph model for
k = 1.
From underlying graph of true relationships between users,
g, we obtain two independent samples g1 = (V,Eg1) and
g2 = (V,Eg2), as shown with an example in Figure 1,
that represent the connectivity graphs of two different social
network platforms. As in [3], we assume that only edges are
sampled and not nodes, i.e., both social networks capture the
same population of individuals. In particular:
P{(u, v) ∈ Egi} =
{
s if (u, v) ∈ Eg
0 otherwise
for i = 1, 2 where we further assume that each edge is sampled
independently.
In the context of the de-anonymization problem, we assume
that all the labels of the nodes of g1 are given and the attacker’s
goal is to recover the labels of g2 given g1. However, as noted
in Section I, we will assume that the community assignments
are known in both g1 and g2. This problem is equivalent
to finding a matching between the node sets of two graphs.
A matching of g1’s nodes to g2’s nodes, which is also a
permutation over [n], will be denoted as pi : V → V , where Π
is the set of all possible permutations that is compatible with
the community assignments.
With some abuse of notation, for an edge e ∈ Eg1 , we
will allow pi(e) to denote the image of e in Eg2 . That is,
for (u, v) ∈ Eg1 , pi((u, v)) = (pi(u), pi(v)). Given community
labels, Eijgk refers to the subset of edges in gk (k ∈ {1, 2})
that lie between nodes in community Ci and Cj and similar
definition follows for Eijg .
III. MAXIMUM A POSTERIORI DE-ANONYMIZATION
In this section, we derive the MAP estimate of pi (the label-
ing of nodes in g2), assuming an a priori uniform distribution
over pi, given realizations of g1 and g2. In particular, we will
show that the the MAP estimate corresponds to the matching
that minimizes the cost function, ∆pi that we define below.
Definition 1.
∆pi =
k∑
i≤j
ωij
 ∑
e∈Eijg1
1{pi(e) /∈ Eijg2}+
∑
e∈Eijg2
1{pi−1(e) /∈ Eijg1}

(1)
where
ωij = log
(
1− pijs(2− s)
pij(1− s)2
)
,
and
∑k
i≤j is the short-hand notation for
∑
1≤i≤j≤k.
By virtue of being the MAP estimate, minimizing ∆pi corre-
sponds to the attacker’s optimal strategy that minimizes error
probability [8], i.e., the probability of obtaining an incorrect
matching. On the other hand, if we set all the weights ωij
in Equation 1 to 1, ∆pi above would correspond to the “edge
mismatch” cost function that [3] and subsequent works [5],
[4] minimize. This strategy is sub-optimal, in general, for
community structured graphs.
Now, we define the MAP estimate of pi given g1 and g2 as:
MAP(g1, g2) = arg max
pi∈Π
p(pi|g1, g2) ,
which can be further written as:
MAP(g1, g2) = arg max
pi∈Π
∑
g∈Gpi
p(g, pi|g1, g2) ,
where Gpi is the set of all underlying graphs that are consistent
with g1 and g2 given pi.
Theorem 1. Assuming pij < 1/2 for all i, j ∈ [1, k]
MAP(g1, g2) = arg min
pi∈Π
∆pi
Proof: Let us start with elaborating MAP(g1, g2),
MAP(g1, g2)
= arg max
pi∈Π
∑
g∈Gpi
p(g1|g) · p(g2|g, pi) · p(g) (2)
= arg maxpi∈Π
∑
g∈Gpi
∏k
i≤j(1− s)|E
ij
g |−|Eijg1 |s|E
ij
g1
|
·∏ki≤j(1− s)|Eijg |−|Eijg2 |s|Eijg2 |
·∏ki≤j p|Eijg |ij (1− pij)Nij−|Eijg |
(3)
= arg max
pi∈Π
 k∏
i≤j
(
s
1− s
)|Eijg1 |+|Eijg2 |
(1− pij)Nij

·
∑
g∈Gpi
k∏
i≤j
(
pij(1− s)2
1− pij
)|Eijg |
= arg max
pi∈Π
∑
g∈Gpi
k∏
i≤j
(
pij(1− s)2
1− pij
)|Eijg |
(4)
In (2) we used the facts that distribution of g1 given g is
independent of the labeling of g2, and pi has uniform prior
distribution. In (3), N ij is the number of node pairs from
communities Ci and Cj , and while writing (4) we used the
observation that
∑k
i≤j
(|Eijg1 |+ |Eijg2 |) = |Eg1 |+ |Eg2 | is
constant given g1 and g2.
Now let g∗pi denote the graph having the smallest number of
edges in Gpi , i.e, g∗pi = (V,Eg1∪pi(Eg2)). Note that Gpi consists
of all graphs whose edge sets are supersets of g∗pi . Summing
over all graphs in Gpi , we get:
MAP(g1, g2) = arg max
pi∈Π

k∏
i≤j
(
pij(1− s)2
1− pij
)|Eij
g∗pi
|
·
k∏
i≤j
Nij−|Eijg∗pi |∑
aij=0
(
Nij − |Eijg∗pi |
aij
)(
pij(1− s)2
1− pij
)aij
(5)
Noting that sum in (5) is a binomial sum, we can further write
(5) as:
arg maxpi∈Π
∏k
i≤j
(
pij(1−s)2
1−pijs(2−s)
)|Eij
g∗pi
|
= arg minpi∈Π
∑k
i≤j |Eijg∗pi | log
(
1−pijs(2−s)
pij(1−s)2
)
(6)
Now we observe that
|Eijg∗pi | =
1
2
(|Eijg1 |+ |Eijg2 |+
∑
e∈Eijg1
1{pi(e) /∈ Eijg2}+
∑
e∈Eijg2
1{pi−1(e) /∈ Eijg1}
 ,
which allows us to write (6) as
arg min
pi∈Π
∑k
i≤j ωij
(∑
e∈Eijg1 1{pi(e) /∈ E
ij
g2}
+
∑
e∈Eijg2 1{pi
−1(e) /∈ Eijg1}
)
= arg min
pi∈Π
∆pi
since |Eijg1 |+ |Eijg2 | does not depend on pi.
Corollary 1.1. If g is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with edge
probability p < 1/2
MAP(g1, g2) =
arg min
pi∈Π
 ∑
e∈Eg1
1{pi(e) /∈ Eg2}+
∑
e∈Eg2
1{pi−1(e) /∈ Eg1}

(7)
Proof: Set k = 1 in Theorem 1 and note that for p11 <
1/2, ω11 > 0.
Remark 1. The cost function in (7) is the same as the “edge
mismatch” cost function that [3] and subsequent works [5],
[4] minimize, but without proof of optimality. Corollary 1.1
establishes that when g is an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph, minimizing
the edge mismatch cost function as defined by [3] indeed
corresponds to the attacker’s optimal strategy. This optimality
result for the special case of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs is also
presented in a concurrent work [9]. For the general case with
two or more communities on the other hand, Theorem 1 shows
that inter-community and intra-community edge mismatches
must be weighted differently.
IV. PROBABILITY OF ERROR
In the previous section, we characterized the attacker’s
optimal de-anonymization strategy for finite n. In this section,
we derive sufficient conditions for which the attacker can find
asymptotically almost surely the correct matching for the two
community case. For notational simplicity let p = p11 = p22
and q = p12. The corresponding result in the classical Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi model follows as a special case.
Theorem 2. Given g1, g2 and p, q → 0 where q ≤ p, if
s
(
1−
√
1− s2
)(
p+ 2 · n2
n1
q
)
=
3 log n1
n1
+ ω(n−11 ) ,
s
(
1−
√
1− s2
)(
p+ 2 · n1
n2
q
)
=
3 log n2
n2
+ ω(n−12 ) ,
then the probability of error of the attacker can approach zero
asymptotically, i.e., arg minpi ∆pi = pi0 a.a.s. as n1, n2 → ∞
where pi0 is the correct matching.
Proof: Note that in ∆pi , as p, q → 0, ω11ω12 → 1 if
p = Θ(q). For tractability of our proof, we will assume
that the attacker uses a sub-optimal cost function ∆′pi where
ω11
ω12
= 1. Since the error probability with ∆′pi upper bounds
that with ∆pi , we still obtain sufficient conditions for correct
de-anonymization.
Let
Sk1,k2 =
∑
pi∈Πk1,k2
1{∆′pi ≤ ∆′0}
where ∆′0 is the cost corresponding to pi0. Here Πk1,k2 denotes
the set of label assignments for nodes in g2 that is compatible
with the given community assignment and where k1 of the
nodes in C1 and k2 of those in C2 are mismatched. Note Sk1,k2
denotes the number of node matchings with ki mismatches
in Ci that has mismatch cost not greater than that of true
matching. Let us denote the number of labelings with at least
one mismatch and edge cost not greater than ∆′0 with S, that is
S =
n1∑
k1=0
n2∑
k2=0, k1+k2 6=0
Sk1,k2 (8)
Our proof is based on showing the expected value of S, a non-
negative random variable, is asymptotically 0 if the conditions
stated in the theorem are satisfied, therefore guaranteeing that
an attacker using the ∆′pi cost function would be able to recover
the true matching. We have
E[S] =
∑
k1
∑
k2
∑
pi∈Πk1,k2
P{∆′pi −∆′0 ≤ 0}
≤
∑
k1
∑
k2
|Πk1,k2 | · max
pi∈Πk1,k2
P{∆′0 −∆′pi ≥ 0} (9)
where the summations still have the same restrictions of (8)
but we omitted to keep the notation simple. Note that based
on the definitions of ∆′0 and ∆
′
pi , any node pair, e, satisfying
e = pi(e) contributes equally to ∆′pi and ∆
′
0, whether they
have an edge between them or not. Let us define the sets
Epiintra = {e ∈ (C1 × C1) ∪ (C2 × C2) : e 6= pi(e)}
Epiinter = {e ∈ C1 × C2 : e 6= pi(e)}
Note
|Epiintra| =
∑
i=1,2
[(
ki
2
)
+ ki(ni − ki)
]
− |Epitr| (10)
|Epiinter| = k1n2 + k2n1 − k1k2
where the sum in (10) is the number of intra-community node
pairs having at least one mismatched node under pi and Epitr is
the set of pairs that are transpositions of pi, that is pairs (a, b)
with pi(a) = b and pi(b) = a. We can write
∆′0 −∆′pi = Ypi −Xpi
where
Ypi =
∑
e∈Epiintra
|1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{e ∈ Eg2}|
+
∑
e∈Epiinter
|1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{e ∈ Eg2}|
and
Xpi =
∑
e∈Epiintra
|1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{pi(e) ∈ Eg2}|
+
∑
e∈Epiinter
|1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{pi(e) ∈ Eg2}| .
We can rewrite the difference between Ypi and Xpi as
Ypi −Xpi =
∑
e∈Epiintra
Ae +
∑
e∈Epiinter
Be where
Ae = Be = |1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{e ∈ Eg2}|
− |1{e ∈ Eg1} − 1{pi(e) ∈ Eg2}|
Note although the expressions for Ae and Be are the same,
their distributions are possibly different since they involve
intra- and inter-community edges respectively. Specifically,
u1 , P{Ae = 1} =P {e ∈ Eg1 , pi(e) ∈ Eg2 , e /∈ Eg2}
+P {e /∈ Eg1 , pi(e) /∈ Eg2 , e ∈ Eg2}
=ps(1− s)
By similar arguments
u3 , P{Ae = −1} = ps(s+ 1− 2ps)
v1 , P{Be = 1} = qs(1− s)
v3 , P{Be = −1} = qs(s+ 1− 2qs)
and define u2 , 1− u1 − u3, v2 , 1− v1 − v3. If we denote
Z =
∑
e∈EpiintraAe and T =
∑
e∈EpiinterBe, we get
P{∆′0−∆′pi ≥ 0} = P{Ypi−Xpi ≥ 0} = P{Z+T ≥ 0} (11)
Terms of the sum in Z can be dependent due to cycles in
the mapping pi, and so are those of T , but each term in
Z is independent of all terms in T . Next we decompose Z
and T into three sums such that each sum consists of only
independent terms.
Proposition 1. There exists a partition Epiintra = ∪3i=1Epiintra,i
such that( ⋃
e∈Epiintra,i
{pi(e)}
)
∩ Epiintra,i = Ø and (12)
∣∣Epiintra,i∣∣ ≥ ⌊ |Epiintra|3
⌋
for all i = 1, 2, 3. (13)
Similar result holds for Epiinter = ∪3i=1Epiinter,i.
Proof: For any mapping pi, we define a dependency graph
Dpi such that every node pair in Epiintra corresponds to a vertex
in Dpi . An edge exists between e and e′ of Dpi if and only
if pi(e) = e′ or pi(e′) = e. Any partitioning of Epiintra that
meets (12) corresponds to a vertex coloring in Dpi . Note that
Dpi consists of a finite number of disjoint cycles. Thus, we can
color Dpi using three colors (since an odd cycle would require
three colors [10]). The second condition of the Proposition
(13) follows from induction on the number of cycles in Dpi .
Accordingly we let
Zi =
∑
e∈Epiintra,i
Ae and Ti =
∑
e∈Epiinter,i
Be
Continuing from (11),
P{Z + T ≥ 0} = P{∑3i=1(Zi + Ti) ≥ 0}
≤∑3i=1 P{Zi + Ti ≥ 0} ≤ 3 maxi P{Zi + Ti ≥ 0} (14)
For i = 1, 2, 3
P{Zi + Ti ≥ 0} = P{eϕ(Zi+Ti) ≥ 1} ϕ > 0
≤ E[eϕ(Zi+Ti)] (15)
=
(
u1e
ϕ + u2 + u3e
−ϕ)nZi (v1eϕ + v2 + v3e−ϕ)nTi
≤ exp [nZi(u3 − eϕu1)(e−ϕ − 1)
+ nTi(v3 − eϕv1)(e−ϕ − 1)
] (16)
where nZi = |Epiintra,i| and nTi = |Epiinter,i|, (15) is due to
Markov’s inequality and we use the inequality x ≤ ex−1 in
(16). To find the smallest upper bound, we find the ϕ∗ that
sets the derivative of the exponent in (16), which is a convex
function of ϕ, to 0. Inserting ϕ∗ in the expression we get
P{Zi + Ti ≥ 0} ≤ e−(
√
nZiu3+nTiv3−
√
nZiu1+nTiv1)
2
(17)
Now we find lower bounds on nZi and nTi
nZi ≥
⌊ |Epiintra|
3
⌋
≥ 1
3
∑
i=1,2
[(
ki
2
)
+ ki(ni − ki)
]
− |E
pi
tr|
3
− 1
≥ 1
3
∑
i=1,2 ki
(
ni − ki2 − 1
)− 1 and (18)
nTi ≥
⌊ |Epiinter|
3
⌋
≥ k1n2 + k2n1 − k1k2
3
− 1
≥ k1n2 + k2n1
6
− 1
(18) is due to the bound |Epitr| ≤ (k1+k2)/2. It can be checked
that the derivative of the exponent in (17) with respect to
both nZi and nTi is negative for sufficiently small p and q.
Therefore from (17) and the lower bounds over nZi and nTi
found above,
P{Zi + Ti ≥ 0} ≤ e− s3 (1−
√
1−s2)(k1n1p+k1n2q+k2n2p+k2n1q)
(19)
From (11), (14) and (19),
P{∆′0 −∆′pi ≥ 0} ≤ 3e
s
3 (
√
1−s2−1)(k1n1p+k1n2q+k2n2p+k2n1q)
Let us now upper bound the other term in the summand of
(9),
|Πk1,k2 | ≤ nk11 nk22 = exp [k1 log n1 + k2 log n2] (20)
Using (19) and (20) in (9) we get,
E[S] ≤
3
∑
k1
∑
k2
exp
[
k1
[
log n1 − s(1−
√
1− s2)(n1p+ n2q)/3
]
+ k2
[
log n2 − s(1−
√
1− s2)(n2p+ n1q)/3
]]
The sum goes to 0 and thus we guarantee successful MAP
de-anonymization if
s
(
1−
√
1− s2
)(
p+
n2
n1
q
)
=
3 log n1
n1
+ ω(n−11 ) and
s
(
1−
√
1− s2
)(
p+
n1
n2
q
)
=
3 log n2
n2
+ ω(n−12 ) .
Corollary 2.1. In the case of single community (regular
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with n1 nodes), a sufficient condition for
de-anonymization is
ps
(
1−
√
1− s2
)
=
3 log n1
n1
+ ω(n−11 ).
Proof: The result can be obtained by setting q = 0,
n1 = n2 in Theorem 2. Note that in this case there are no
inter-community edges and the setting is equivalent to de-
anonymization in each community separately.
Remark 2. For the case of symmetric communities, n1 = n2
and non-zero inter-community edge probability q, conditions
given in Theorem 2 are less strict than the result in Corol-
lary 2.1 suggesting that inter-community edges help in the
de-anonymization of nodes within a community.
Remark 3. Concurrent work on the matching of regular
(single-community) correlated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [9] pro-
poses a proof based on combinatorial methods and obtains
a sufficient condition for successful de-anonymization that is
stronger than Corollary 2.1 for the single community case.
However our result in Theorem 2 is more general since it
handles graphs with community structure.
Remark 4. Setting s = 1 in Corollary 2.1 provides the follow-
ing sufficient condition for successful de-anonymization:
p =
3 log n1
n1
+ ω(n−11 ) (21)
Note for this special case, a necessary and sufficient condition
for successful de-anonymization is the graph g not having
any automorphisms (other than itself). The condition for this,
found in [11], is tighter than (21) by a factor of 3, showing that
there is room for improvement in the calculation of probability
of error.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have investigated the de-anonymization
problem in social networks for graphs with community struc-
ture. We have characterized the optimal attack strategy for
this setting by determining the MAP estimate of the matching
pi, and determined sufficient conditions for successful de-
anonymization, asymptotically, for large graphs. For the spe-
cial case of a single community, our results have proved the
optimality of the de-anonymization strategy adopted in prior
work.
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